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ABSTRACT
The new scramble for land in Africa has revived debates on customary 
land tenure – a phenomenon that has become almost synonymous 
with the role of traditional chiefs in land politics. At the same time, inves-
tors continue to seek opportunities in complex customary land tenure 
systems, which may not necessarily be within the absolute domains of 
chiefs. This paper examines the politics of compensation and rent dis-
tribution following the process of a large-scale expropriation of family 
lands for an oil palm plantation in Ghana’s eastern corridor. It demon-
strates how and why the sudden commodification of land and the 
accompanying individualisation of land holdings alter the power struc-
ture and entitlements within families, often concentrating authority in 
the hands of a few elderly male kin and exacerbating inequality. The 
resulting changes could be attributed to the state’s role in land and 
investment policies. However, family heads also used the ensuing pro-
cess of compensation and rent distribution to increase their influence 
and income at the expense of some smallholder farmers, sharecroppers, 
migrants, women and the youth. Even as the state continues to promote 
such farmland investments, civil society and researchers can influence 
public policies to protect marginalised groups.
Introduction
The global land rush has revived debates on customary land tenure in Africa. Within the 
customary setting, different landholding structures co-exist, overlap and sometimes com-
pete. These include, among others, land controlled by chiefs, family heads, earth priests and 
individuals. In a country where chieftaincy is commonly projected above all traditional insti-
tutions, ‘customary’ is frequently defined as ‘occurring at the juncture when chiefs begin to 
allocate land to external investors, and plots are demarcated, rather than at the juncture 
where user rights in land prevail’ (Amanor 2008, 77). In many rural agrarian societies, user 
rights for indigenes or natives are set within the domains of family inheritance systems. In 
contrast, for settlers and migrants, user rights are greatly influenced by the farming and 
labour practices that dictate land use. In Ghana, the matrilineal and patrilineal systems of 
inheritance provide different sets of land-use rights and entitlements to different groups of 
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kin, such as control rights and rules regarding the types of crops that can be cultivated. In 
the event of a transfer of large tracts of family lands to corporate investors, what happens 
to people who may not necessarily have control and ownership rights, but who do have 
user entitlements?
In this paper, I analyse how and why powerful actors within family institutions influence 
how certain groups are granted access to or excluded from rents and compensations in the 
aftermath of land grabs. I focus on the contestations over lands that lie outside the absolute 
domain of chiefs and how they are governed by fluid and intricate bundle of rights embed-
ded in social relations and farming practices.
This study examines resource access politics around the acquisition of 3715 ha of family 
lands by SG-Sustainable Oils Ghana (SG-SOG) for an oil palm plantation in Ghana’s Volta (Oti) 
region. In 2018 and 2019, I conducted fieldwork with affected families of the Brewaniase, 
Fankyenekor, Abuburuwa and Dodo Tamale communities. I gathered data qualitatively 
through key informant interviews, unstructured and semi-structured conversations, and life 
history narratives. I also analysed several documents, including Ghana’s land policies and 
land lease documents, and data on families’ land holdings and rent allocation. Using some 
tenets of ethnography, I also made observations of everyday informal relations with the 
people during my period of stay. I conducted interviews with all 15 representatives of the 
affected families, 32 family members and 12 dispossessed sharecroppers. I also conducted 
five family focus group discussions involving a total of about 30 participants, including 
women and youth. Additionally, I held meetings with chiefs and some traditional authority 
figures.
Customary tenure, legal pluralism and the powers of exclusion
It is widely recognised that African customary land tenure systems are characterised by 
continual negotiation over access, control and user rights (Peters 2013; Yaro 2012). Political, 
economic and territorial transformations from pre-colonial to present times have influenced 
Africans to rely on a multiplicity of norms to govern land (Berry 2017). For instance, following 
the introduction of commercial and export crops including cocoa and oil palm under British 
colonial rule, indigenous farming communities in southern Ghana began to institute share-
cropping arrangements as a way to mobilise land and labour for cocoa (Hill 1969). In partic-
ular, among the Akans, the matrilineal system evolved as a way to exclude northern migrant 
sharecroppers from land ownership even as they became central to the production of such 
export crops (Yaro, Teye, and Torvikey 2018). Additionally, ‘the trajectory of politics since 
independence has also conferred its own peculiarities upon the relationship between the 
state and traditional authority’ (Nugent 1996, 204). Therefore, customary tenure should not 
be detached from and opposed to formal systems; rather, they should be examined as 
simultaneously overlapping and competing institutional spheres that produce differentiated 
relations to land (Griffiths 1986). Furthermore, these land tenure systems have become sites 
of changing institutions and norms. In northern Ghana, earth priests are generally prominent 
in land matters, while chiefs and queen mothers control stool and family1 lands in the south. 
In southern Ghana, there is also a general distinction between the majority Akan group, who 
practice matrilineal inheritance, and others including the Ewes, Ga, Dangme and the Krobo 
ethnic groups, who incline towards the patrilineal practice. Yet even among these ethnic 
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groups, the application of these land tenure institutions has fluid interpretations. Thus, the 
concept of legal pluralism provides a useful way to characterise the co-existence of multiple 
legal and normative frameworks, ie more than one source of law and more than one legal 
order govern land use and ownership (Ubink and Amanor 2008). This concept guides the 
analysis of how production relations within farming systems such as shifting cultivation, 
land rotation, crop and shifting rotation, sharecropping, and pastoralism are intrinsically 
linked to land tenure, especially in shaping and legitimating different land use and access 
rights. So are the existing family norms of patrilineal and matrilineal inheritance, which also 
guide land inheritance and access in Ghana. In other words, the existence of multiple land 
tenure norms which can apply to one situation allows investors and customary authorities 
to perform institution shopping to facilitate large land transfers without problems of legit-
imation (Wartmann, Haller, and Backhaus 2016).
Meanwhile, with the advent of land grabs, we see that both investors and customary 
authorities continue to navigate these pluralistic institutional norms for their own benefit. 
In effect, land laws and ‘customary norms’ are being reworked to facilitate large-scale land 
transactions to the detriment of marginalised social groups, rather than serving as instru-
ments to check and control such deals.
The study adopts Borras and Franco’s (2012, 1725) conceptualisation of land grabs – used 
interchangeably with land deals – as ‘the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land 
and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms, carried out through 
extra-economic coercion that involves large-scale capital, which often shifts resource use 
orientation into extraction, for international and domestic purposes’, and which transforms 
the means of production and reproduction for different groups of people. Subsequently, 
the perspective of Hall, Hirsch, and Li (2013) regarding land control and access through the 
concept of ‘powers of exclusion’ provides a useful analytical framework with which to 
examine the powers that determine ‘who gets what’ in land transfers, and the contentions 
that arise in the bid to maintain and challenge the powers involved – that is, how access (the 
ability to benefit from resources) is maintained by the exclusion or prevention of others, and 
how people lose their existing access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). In the process of land grabs, 
investors wield power over locals through force, coercion and ‘consent’, often changing the 
social relations of production and land access. Also, at the grassroots level, different groups 
and actors can use various forms of power to assert the right to exclude others from land, 
rents, compensation, food and water, but at the same time can be legitimated by the plu-
ralistic laws and norms that structure societies. In this paper, I focus on the relative powers 
that shape access to land and the accompanying material benefits in the aftermath of 
land deals.
Customary tenure among the Ntrubos: families, chieftaincy and farming
The Ntrubos2 are among the few ethnic groups of Ghana’s mid-eastern belt whose socio-po-
litical and cultural formations were reshaped under both the German and British Togoland 
colonial administrations (Mbowura 2012). As noted by Ntewusu (2016, 2), ‘idol worship was 
considered one of the stumbling blocks to trade, especially in Kete Krachi, which was the 
centre of Germans’ rule’. Some clan members trace their lineage to a priest of the historically 
famous Dente Deity in Krachi, who was executed by the Germans (Maier 1983). Other tales 
from the indigenes also point to the first settlers being hunters and traditionalists, who 
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Figure 1. The patrilineal system of land access among the Ntrubos.
Source: author’s construct, 2020.
became earth priests over shrines around which settlements grew and agglomerated. Over 
time, the earth priests’ authority extended beyond the spiritual domain to control land 
resources. (Ntrubo means to ‘take the lead’.) Thus, they trace their settlement to tales of 
migration from North-Eastern Nigeria to Togo, particularly Atakpamé. Being first-comers, 
their autochthony claims relegate other ethnicities, including people from the Akebu, 
Basari, Kotokoli, Konkomba, Ewe, Akan, Ga and the Ga-Dangme ethnicities, to settler and 
migrant groups.
As used in this paper, ‘family lands’ refers to customary lands under the custody of family 
heads. Among the Ntrubo ethnic group, even though the paramount chief remains the 
overlord of all the communities under his jurisdiction (see Figure 1), family heads control 
land. Unlike the Akans in southern Ghana, the authority of the Ntrubo paramount3 chief is 
not derived from control over land resources. This is also contrary to other West African 
contexts, including some areas in Sierra Leone, where paramount chiefs remain the custo-
dians of family lands within their chiefdoms (Ryan 2018). Among the Ntrubo clan, the par-
amount chief and his sub-chiefs symbolise authority and are responsible for cultural and 
social cohesion within the paramountcy,4 but land allocation and distribution are managed 
and controlled within the family system. During fieldwork, a commonly expressed assertion 
was that ‘if the chief has any land, it is because he belongs to a family’. Nonetheless, the 
chieftaincy plays a principal role in resolving land conflicts at the local level.
Under their patrilineal inheritance system, land use and control rights are passed along 
one’s father’s lineage (see Figure 1). The extent of agricultural activity also determines enti-
tlements within families. Farms can become the basis of more definite land fragmentation 
– a system that favours men and older sons over women and daughters. Access and control 
over land are widely differentiated. Sometimes lineal entitlement depends on household 
generational composition: particularly the gender dynamics, and the number of children 
and wives of the male family head. Within some extended families, there are portions of land 
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reserved as ‘family commons’ or ‘abusua asase’, which are unfragmented and protected in 
the name of a common ancestor. In such cases, family members, including women, may 
have usufruct rights to this land for seasonal food crop farming and hunting, and they can 
allocate portions to sharecroppers to cultivate food crops. Usually, families preserve ‘family 
commons’ for future generations. In polygamous families, and concerning lands with prop-
erty crops (eg cocoa), family heads may subdivide land among inheritors. Having property 
crops on ‘family commons’ often breeds conflicts over revenue distribution. Gyasi (1994) 
reports instances whereby farmers fell oil palm trees on family commons rather than go 
through the trouble of sharing the yields or revenue. However, it is also possible to have 
multiple entitlement claims or generally accepted co-ownership, even if a household head 
has a priority claim, as reported in Niger by Turner and Moumouni (2019).
Families can make portions of their lands accessible to ‘non-indigenes’ through marriage, 
gifts, sales, sharecropping and land rental. Like ownership from an inheritance, land acquired 
by non-indigenes through gifts and sales are usually customary freehold, and they rarely 
become leasehold unless formally registered. Among the non-indigenes, settlers are explic-
itly distinguished from migrants. Early-comer ethnic groups, including the Ewes, Bassari and 
Kotokoli who have large populations, are considered settlers, not migrants. The Ntrubo par-
amountcy even allows these groups to have their own local chiefs, to symbolise their rec-
ognition. They can access and own land through labour, gifts and sales. In contrast, the 
Zamlama, Fulani pastoralists, Akebu and the Konkomba people are considered migrants or 
‘foreigners’ (locally termed ‘ahohoo’), irrespective of the years spent on Ntrubo soil; they do 
not have officially recognised chiefs and their access to land is primarily through tenancy.
Historically, the concept of labour in these communities transcended a purely economic 
function to one that was embedded in a moral economy of subsistence, locally termed ‘dodi’. 
Thus, in the past, sharecropping arrangements for food crop cultivation were not strictly 
defined but based on a premise of allowing migrants or foreigners to access land to produce 
enough food for their families and to share some of the surpluses with their hosts. In recent 
times, such ‘dodi’ arrangements are more familiar with sharecroppers who are family relatives, 
especially through marriage, or with those who are also residential tenants on their landlords’ 
land. Native landowners may also spare aged sharecroppers and women who farm tiny plots 
for food from share arrangements. Nonetheless, in an era of high population growth, scarcity 
of suitable lands and an increasing cash economy, the culture of ‘dodi’ is seriously threatened. 
Despite this, sharecropping arrangements for food crops are still relatively flexible, depend-
ing on the existing tenant–landowner relations and the crops’ market value. As expected, 
the sharecropping of cash crops is always contractual. Depending on the household edu-
cational and population dynamics, wage labour is also very prominent for farm activities 
such as weed slashing, making of mounds,5 land preparation and rice harvesting.
The making of the SG-SOG oil palm land deal
Throughout Africa, there has been a systematic effort to justify large-scale land acquisitions 
as a way of filling finance and technology gaps, enhancing productivity and utilising idle 
lands, promoting food security and creating jobs for youth, among many other reasons 
(Moyo, Yeros, and Jha 2012). However, the livelihood outcomes of many of these land invest-
ments indicate that impacts are differentiated and often do not benefit the most 
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marginalised groups in rural communities (Bruna 2019; Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017; 
Kumeh and Omulo 2019; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr 2017). Still, development 
narratives drive large-scale investments throughout Africa. In Ghana, state institutions and 
agencies even help investors secure ‘litigation-free’ and earmarked lands, alongside numer-
ous tax incentives. Although the promotion of market-led land policies distances the state 
from actual land transactions, it gives foreign investors easy access to remote rural lands, 
80% of which are customarily held. In an interview, an official with a regional Lands 
Commission emphasised that ‘we are only involved as a commissioner’. So, any land trans-
action outcome depends on the negotiations between investors and families, chiefs, and 
individuals. Regarding land values and crop compensation, the state only sets the minimum 
rates upon which negotiations are premised.
When it comes to the oil palm sector, the state has not only played a facilitative role but 
has been directly involved through special projects and joint ventures with the private sector 
for plantation schemes. The four most extensive oil palm plantations in Ghana were estab-
lished through ‘lawful’ compulsory land acquisitions by the state in the 1970s. The plantations 
were intended to contribute to the agricultural export sector, traditionally dominated by 
cocoa. To date, all four of these oil palm plantations have seen some form of privatisation 
and expansion in scale, and make up a total of about 40,000 ha of estates and outgrower 
schemes (Sarpong 2013). In 2003, the New Patriotic (NPP) Government, under the presidency 
of the newly elected John Kufuor, launched the President’s Special Initiative (PSI) project, 
which targeted specific industries and agricultural sectors, including oil palm, to expand 
Ghana’s market base and increase its competitiveness at the global level (Asante 2012). Oil 
palm, a staple in the Ghanaian food and chemical industry, was facing deficits of about 
240,000 tonnes per year in production for domestic consumption and failing to meet its 
potential to compete with Southeast Asia in meeting the demands of the West. The PSI 
project was implemented through oil palm research and nursery plantations established 
through private operators.6 Although the project could not achieve its ambitious target of 
bringing 300,000 ha of land under oil palm cultivation, it certainly contributed to expanding 
investor and farmer interest in the sector, by establishing estates and related businesses 
along the value chain. The SG-SOG land acquisition emerged in the context of the PSI project 
in the region.
In January 2009, SG-SOG,7 now operating as Volta Red Farms,8 made a deed of lease for 
the transfer of approximately 3715 ha semi-deciduous forest lands belonging to families in 
Brewaniase. The 50-year lease was endorsed by the Lands Registry in 2010. However, state-
ments from key informant interviews indicate that land clearance began in March 2008, 
suggesting that the actual enclosure may have occurred as early as 2007. To amass frag-
mented family lands, the investor required a great deal of mobilisation to build mutual 
consent. An influential politician and member of the rural elite, who was also a large-scale 
oil palm farmer and formerly the best farmer of the region, played the role of middleman to 
mobilise consent from families. He also took on the role of deal negotiator. Using a non-gov-
ernmental organisation (NGO) development discourse, he utilised his managerial position 
in the PSI oil palm programme, his political aspirations, and his familiarity with the local 
context and the untapped production sites to facilitate the appropriation of the Ntrubo 
family lands (see also Sud 2014).
As inhabitants of a geographically remote and deprived district seeking both visibility 
and development, it is not surprising that people appreciated and linked the activities of 
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the few existing NGOs (notably World Vision International) to promises of corporate social 
responsibility (especially scholarships) and, ultimately, to the illusion of the plantation 
becoming their community project in the future. These discourses resonated with the 
rent-seeking family heads of patriarchal institutions, where women and youth were passive 
in decision-making processes. Furthermore, family heads had different class interests. The 
vast majority of the family representatives involved in the deal had access to alternative 
sources of family lands. However, the few representatives who would lose all of their farm 
land were later compelled to agree to the deal after unsuccessful contestations.
The family representatives also capitalised on the paramount chief’s limited authority 
over land to exclude him from the details of the land deal, except for his endorsement of 
the already signed lease, which was imposed on them by the investors’ legal team. The 
paramount chief’s endorsement is a legal requirement, reaffirming that the state consolidates 
chieftaincy authority above all other customary institutions. It is also a symbol of reverence 
from the families to the stool,9 as well as the chief’s recognition of the authority of families 
over their own lands. A family representative, recalling their encounter with the chief, said, 
‘When we brought it [the lease] to the chief, he requested that he be given some time to 
review it, but we opposed it …. It was already cooked, so we were in a hurry to have it’.
The family heads’ control over the transaction was also a way to guard against the pro-
posed conversion of the family lands to stool lands – a situation that would strip them of 
their authority and their control over their lands and full access to rents (see also Lanz, Gerber, 
and Haller 2018). Indeed, their fears were reified in a nearby village where SG-SOG acquired 
another 630 ha of family, stool and individual lands: the project was abandoned, and all the 
affected lands are now under the custody of the chieftaincy. However, it is worth noting that 
a few years later, when the affected Ntrubo families realised the shadiness of the deal, the 
families turned to the chief to mediate their lawsuit against the company, thus reaffirming 
the social function of chieftaincy institutions among the Ntrubo people. Following the liti-
gation and the company’s shift in attention to a larger oil palm investment10 in Cameroon, 
the original investors left the scene, and in 2013 the management of the plantation was 
taken over by Volta Red Farms.11 Volta Red also operates an oil palm processing plant in an 
adjoining district, about 25 km from the plantation.
The acquired lands belong to 15 extended family groups of the Ntrubo clan, directly 
affecting over 500 people across four generations. Of the 3715 ha of land acquired, the 15 
extended families are paid rent for a total of 3028.21 ha (see Table 1); 4.63 ha are community 
lands; the remaining 682.16 ha have been rendered a ‘grey zone’ by the company – allegedly 
unsuitable and mountainous land for which families are denied rent.
Table 1. landholdings of family groups within the concession.








8 114.67 Total 3028.21
Source: author’s fieldwork, 2018–2019.
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Migrant and settler sharecropping families, whom the landholding families refer to as 
‘their foreigners’, also resided and farmed employing land rotation. The land was a source of 
local varieties of timber, wild bananas, cola, citrus and oil palm, and fuelwood, and served 
as subsistence hunting grounds. Most of the families without alternative farmlands also lived 
and farmed on the affected lands. This group of landholders and their households were 
eventually displaced and dispossessed. Many have now resorted to occupying smaller parcels 
of frontier lands on sharecropping terms, thereby relegating them to the status of landless 
settlers.
Among landholding households, women, the youth and members with derived and usu-
fruct land use entitlements are significantly impacted by the land deal. Community-wide, 
the company provided a few boreholes as well as learning materials to support basic schools. 
However, people expressed concerns about their limited access to construction sand, herbs 
and fuelwood, and their inability to hunt for bushmeat. Community members anticipated 
job opportunities; however, their hopes have been dashed given the low employment oppor-
tunities and the working conditions that are unfavourable for many.
Formalising spatial boundaries and the politics of exclusion
The Ghanaian state has been putting in effort to incorporate all forms of land tenure into a 
common law framework through land administration programmes and legal reforms. This 
requires comprehensive mapping and registration of land holdings and rights (Campion 
and Acheampong 2014). Many rural agrarian societies do not necessarily abide by these 
laws, but they become nearly imperative in formal land transactions. Prior to the land deal, 
landholders did not have formal land titles, nor were boundaries officially demarcated and 
mapped out. When the acquired land was surveyed and mapped, the affected families 
became aware of the size and the monetary value of their lands. Before this, due to the 
practice of land rotation, shifting cultivation and small-scale farming, families focussed more 
on everyday claims to actual farms than on ownership rights to extended areas of unfarmed 
family lands. Besides, given the relative abundance of land, it is a norm for landowners to 
allow sharecroppers (who cultivate food crops) the autonomy to farm lands based on their 
own capacity rather than mapping out and allocating fixed farm sizes for them when they 
begin cultivation.
A few family heads arranged the initial selection of areas to be covered by the concession 
and, subsequently, the cadastral. Initially, about four family heads agreed to make their lands 
available. However, later, when the investor started working through a middleman and asked 
for more land, they extended their authority to other lands – farmed land, forests and fallow 
lands. The remaining families were only passively consulted, through persuasion and forced 
consent, although some happily supported the project as they expected economic and 
social gain. Popular accounts suggest that a vast proportion of the land was not under cul-
tivation by indigenes. Although there is a general perception that the acquired lands were 
the most fertile, infrastructure re-planning in the 1960s led to the construction of a new 
highway, resulting in a mass movement and involuntary resettlement along with the new 
development, leaving behind just a few families and tenants. Another major reason for the 
presumed ‘idleness’ of the land has been the prevalence of trans-border bushfires (the area 
is on the Ghana–Togo border), putting cocoa farms at risk. The class dynamics of the leaders 
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and family heads also played a significant role in influencing families’ attitudes towards the 
land transfer. This can be linked to three key features: the size or share of the land owned by 
them or their nuclear family; their pre-existing land use; and their access to alternative family 
lands. Among the 15 extended families in question, three were utterly displaced and dis-
possessed, had the largest household sizes, and were not represented in the land ownership 
association’s leadership. Their resistance efforts were further weakened by the location of 
their farmlands within the concession. While some family heads agitated about the lack of 
transparency, women and youth were removed entirely from the decision-making process.
As a settler society, transfers through gifts and sales have been the premise for land access 
for non-indigenes. Nevertheless, because these transfers do not conform strictly to classical 
or Western notions of ‘markets’ but are embedded in social relations of (re)production, the 
sudden commodification of the land disrupted the existing relations between landowning 
families and settlers who purchased land from, or were given land by, natives of the past 
generation. Some of these settler families were excluded from the mapping processes. The 
few who joined the survey team had their land boundaries, and thus their share of the land 
rents, contested by the respective landholding families.
The institutionalisation of exclusion through compensation
In many land expropriation cases, the rules of compensation are contentious (Kuusaana 
2017). In the Ghanaian context, the legal basis for compensation is flawed on several levels. 
The procedure for claim-making makes the active involvement of marginalised groups 
impossible, thus leading to the underestimation of compensation and the control of it by 
dominant classes and alliances (Amanor 1999). By design, the existing legislation is more 
applicable to state land acquisitions than to private transfers and does not effectively address 
the complex customary configurations of rights and entitlements – the main source of ambi-
guities in compensation. With compulsory land acquisitions, the seller is expected to hire 
an independent valuer to determine fair compensation. The mandate of the Land Valuation 
Division (LVD) of the Lands Commission is restricted to government transactions; private 
individuals can only hire their services at a fee. Financially constrained families, once again, 
have to abide by the terms of the company’s valuer. As noted by an official of the Land 
Commission, ‘the valuer is expected to value it [the crop] at the government’s rate or higher’, 
and the final values result from a negotiation involving all parties.
Compensation by the SG-SOG only came into effect after confrontation by some dis-
possessed families. Not only is it uneconomical for a company that almost evaded com-
pensation to ensure fair rates, but there is also a historical trend of the government’s crop 
valuation rates being undervalued. A landowner lamented, ‘we did not negotiate the 
rent, it was imposed, and the price is bad’. It is no coincidence that the principal legislation 
that governs compulsory land acquisitions and, consequently, is the source of the com-
pensation rules, was enacted in the 1960s (Larbi 2009). This was a political-economic 
period when Ghana, like many other African countries, adopted new investment policies 
through multipartite arrangements to facilitate import-substituting industrialisation, 
which became a crucial economic transformation (Graham 1993). What followed was 
large-scale expropriation of peasant lands in the 1960s and 1970s for oil palm plantations, 
some of which still have ongoing compensation-related disputes. For instance, between 
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1979 and 1995, compensation rates remained the same and did not reflect the devalua-
tion of the cedi (Amanor 1999). To date, compensation is only narrowly measured by the 
value of lost crops.
Internal processes between and within the family groupings for the disbursement of 
compensation reinforce the existing and evolving power dynamics along the lines of eth-
nicity, class and gender. In the case under consideration in this study, the family represen-
tatives could not deny crop compensation to settlers and migrants who farmed land through 
rental, usufruct rights, sales and gifts. Unlike ownership of land, which can easily be disputed 
within families, every farmer is entitled to the fruits of their labour without contention 
(Kasanga 1999). Hence, doing otherwise would be illegitimate and would instigate overt 
conflicts, which is highly undesirable in these rural communities. Nonetheless, in a customary 
society where a multiplicity of norms govern parallel situations, most sharecroppers were 
not automatically entitled to compensation, even when their crops were destroyed. First, 
there is the broad, ethnicity-based differentiation between ‘foreigners’ and ‘settlers’, which 
also translates generally into a similar variation between sharecroppers and the rest, ie those 
who access land through rental, usufruct rights, purchase, and gifts. Cultivators on rented 
lands are regarded as farmers – they pay rent in advance and are therefore entitled to the 
farm’s yields. Unfortunately, sharecroppers who cultivate food crops pay their ‘rents’ in cash 
or food upon harvest. With monetary compensation on offer, some landowners re-invoked 
the labouring ‘classness’ of these sharecroppers instead of their farmer status to justify their 
exclusion from compensation. Sharecroppers have little negotiating capacity; as a landholder 
reiterated: ‘If you have farmed my land, and I am asking you to uproot your food and leave 
my land because the land has been taken by a company, is there any problem with it? They 
[sharecroppers] are “nobodies”’.
Similar to Arhin’s (1986, 30) observations, some landowners reveal the share arrangements 
only after making a thorough inspection of the mature farm and the yield potential. The few 
open spaces left for negotiation are determined by the existing social relations with the 
landowners, although the outcomes are unpredictable. The son of a dispossessed share-
cropper stated:
Prior to the takeover, my father had about eight acres of yam farm. His landowner asked him to 
intercrop cassava in the yam farm because he wanted a third of the cassava as a sharecropping 
arrangement. However, my father did not share the yam produce with the landowner because 
the landlord traces his lineage to their [sharecroppers’] hometown, although they are not from 
the same clan …. My father did not receive compensation. Now my father has been able to 
acquire only two acres of land from another family, and the new sharecropping arrangement 
is one rope [0.1 acres]12 for the landowner.13
Basing compensation on certain crops creates a false dichotomy between ‘cash’ and ‘food’ 
crops and has class, ethnicity, and gender dimensions that cannot be overlooked. The main 
crops covered in the compensation package were cocoa and oil palm. These so-called ‘prop-
erty’ crops are cultivated by men. Usually, even if a woman inherits such property, it is main-
tained by the men in the family. When women are not independently farming (corn and 
cassava), they are most likely to be intercropping vegetables (garden eggs, peppers and 
legumes) in their family farms. By both local norms and state priorities, vegetables – a sig-
nificant source of food and cash for women – are undervalued, and thus uncompensated. 
For these systemic reasons, coupled with patriarchal practices of resource distribution, 
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women were excluded from compensation. Notably, while some landowners and tenants 
were able to negotiate compensation for food crops like wild bananas, others, especially the 
Konkomba sharecroppers, were severely affected. Some family heads devalued their long-
standing Konkomba sharecroppers to the position of ‘squatters’, thereby legitimating their 
exclusion from compensation. This is intrinsically linked to existing socio-cultural perceptions 
around the Konkombas – symbolising ‘non-belonging’ and ‘mere landless labourers’, and 
sometimes even with connotations of an ethnically violent and inferior group.
Rent and the reconfiguration of power and entitlements
In exchange for the family lands, the company pays an annual rent of approximately 5 USD 
per hectare – subject to a 2.5% annual increment. Echoing the stories of many others, a 
prominent family head expressed, ‘when we asked him [the middleman] about the terms, 
he said we should cunningly allow the white man to put the palm tree in the ground before 
discussing it because of its development prospects’. The initial rent payout brought disap-
pointment to the families who had high expectation of the US dollars. Many farmers realised 
later that it would actually have been more profitable to give the land to sharecroppers or 
rent it out to locals than to accept the company’s compensation. One noted, ‘If someone 
farms corn on an acre [0.4 ha] for three months, he [the landowner] will get more than 100 
cedis [20 USD]’. Local land rental rates are more than 40 USD per hectare, while 0.4 ha of 
land for sharecropping rice yields a landowner a bag of rice [approximately 25 USD]. In any 
case, the rents cannot support the local economy while the promises of employment were 
also not upheld (see Gyapong 2020).
While family heads had themselves been deceived by the false verbal promises that did 
not correspond with the lease deed, the commodification of the land and the mechanism 
for rent distribution have produced new systems of control that reinforce inequality and 
reconfigure existing social relations around land (Yaro 2012). The family representatives are 
responsible for rent disbursement to their family members, and in many cases are the sole 
keepers of the concession map and the rent list. Traditionally, family heads are selected via 
internal family dynamics based on gender, succession and age, but these factors no longer 
sufficed in selecting representatives. The creation of the family groupings was intended to 
facilitate administrative procedures for the company to disburse the rent. However, these 
groupings did not necessarily translate into an easy process for the extended and dynamic 
family relations which were reduced to a simplified matrix of ‘name’, ‘land owned’ and ‘amount 
due’ on a rent list. A few literate family members and leaders could negotiate and separate 
themselves from their extended kinships to create their own smaller family representations. 
One family representative said:
When they asked us to group into families, I was smart; I did not want many people under me, 
so, I allowed only one person to join me. I foresaw potential rent-related disputes, so I tried to 
avoid that. Family [X], for example, are my close relatives, we are descendants of the same 
grandfather, … but I did not want any trouble.
The two leaders of the landowners’ association are literate, and their families are among 
the least affected. Their share of land in the concession is relatively small (in the bottom five 
in terms of land size) and they have access to suitable alternative lands. Having a voice within 
the family groupings is strongly linked to social status, often overriding one’s land size. For 
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Table 2. Family landholding within the concession.
Fragmented land holdings 












Source: author’s fieldwork, 2018–2019.
instance, the son of the largest rent recipient (with over 200 ha of land but no access to 
alternative family lands) noted, ‘my father is very passive, and he has no voice in these land 
matters’. Besides, as per the peasant nature of their agrarian society, before the land deal, 
interest in land was more closely linked to farm size and crop types, household labour, and 
access to sharecroppers than to ownership (Amanor 2001). Regardless of the size of land 
inherited, landowners and their sharecroppers still farmed on small plots (normally under 
2 ha) at any point in time. Following the formal demarcation of spatial boundaries, well-
landed farmers with suitable alternative family lands benefitted significantly from the rent; 
less landed farmers benefitted more from farming than from rent.
The mechanism of rent disbursement, coupled with the existing individual family dynam-
ics of land tenure, generated different layers of exclusion. After the family representatives 
have received the annual rent, the second layer of disbursement occurs when family mem-
bers whose names appear on the list collect their share. The size of their landholdings ranges 
between 1.4 ha and 244 ha. Approximately 30% of the landholdings are under 10 ha (see 
Table 2). In a few cases, a third level of disbursement is then carried out within the smaller 
families, to those who may have user rights or if the land is part of a family commons (usually, 
unfragmented land belonging to siblings). Except for a few women whose names appear 
on the rent list, thereby securing their entitlement to their inherited lands, the recipients are 
all men. As illustrated in Figure 1, the patrilineal system does not automatically exclude all 
women from land access and control: depending on both generational factors and the extent 
of farming activities, some daughters, nieces and sisters, or their successors, can have strong 
and undisputed claims to land. For instance, when dividing land among his children, a father 
could either reserve portions as ‘family commons’ on which all his children can subsist or 
consolidate the control of an existing farming area to a daughter and her sons, especially if 
they have property crops.
When family representatives described their relations to the landholders on their families’ 
rent list, about 10% were relations to first-generation paternal aunts (see Figure 2). Many of 
the paternal aunts are deceased, so their sons inherit the rent benefits. Aside from the 15 
family representatives themselves, the largest group of rent receivers are first-generation 
men, mainly the paternal uncles of the family representatives.
Many third- and fourth-generation women, who may be daughters or sisters of the family 
representatives, were not entitled to rents, not only because of their gender but in some 
cases because they did not have well-established farms on those lands. Meanwhile, in 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 13
addition to bushfires and the mass resettlement near the newly constructed highway, the 
concession area is more than 7 km from Brewaniase town. Nonetheless, sharecroppers and 
Ntrubo families with no alternative farmlands subsisted on the land. Other entitled family 
members occasionally accessed the lands for purposes other than farming (eg hunting, and 
to visit shrines). Unfortunately, for daughters and sisters who lost their main farmlands, their 
previous entitlements did not translate into a right to benefit from the rent. Their entitle-
ments are concealed on the rent list by labels such as ‘family X’, or ‘brothers X and Y’ – even 
when they have living sisters. Such a mechanism puts control in the hands of elderly men 
and legitimates the exclusion of women from rent. At best, women received tokens from 
‘kind-hearted’ family heads, brothers or fathers.
The situation is no different for the youth whose access to land was through land use, 
rather than ownership, because their fathers were still alive. Third- and fourth-generation 
family members (ie sons, daughters and grandchildren of the family representatives) are not 
represented on the list. The exceptions are the family representatives’ brothers’ sons (ie their 
nephews) who had inherited their deceased fathers’ lands, and a few who had well-estab-
lished family farms on fragmented lands. Following the formalisation process, entitlement 
to rent was deemed analogous to ownership. Thus, family heads have re-invoked the past, 
space and ‘belonging’ to secure their claims to land, and strengthened traditions that support 
such claims (Lund 1998).
The rent list, informed by the mapping, has also become an instrument of pseudo-land 
tenure formalisation. Often, when I enquired from representatives whether there were any 
ongoing conflicts regarding boundaries and rents, they referred to the list as evidence of 
‘who owns what’. Many family members with fragmented lands still did not know their exact 
hectarage or the actual rent expected. Nonetheless, family representatives often used the 
rent list to disprove any ongoing intra-family contestations. It has been used as an effective 
yardstick to forcefully ‘resolve’ intra-family land litigations and misunderstandings that pre-
dated the land grab but did not necessarily disrupt land use at the time. Two affected young 
brothers, who inherited their deceased father’s land, explained in an interview:
Figure 2. rent allocation within families as narrated by second-generation family representatives.14
Source: author’s fieldwork, 2018–2019.
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Our paternal uncle and our father had already divided the land between themselves. We do not 
even know how big our father’s land was, and now our only reference is the map. This map, how 
do they expect us to read it and understand the hectares?
When asking family heads to narrate their familial relationship to the rent beneficiaries, 
I also observed contention around the entitlements of descendants of polygamous families, 
absentee family members and nephews. Many of the contestations also came from people 
with small land sizes, under 5 ha (see also Mudimu et al. 2020 on land lease conflicts in 
Zimbabwe). These groups, and their anger at the injustices of the land deal, corroborated 
family representatives’ attitudes against them and suggested that they did not deserve rent. 
Explaining why Kofi, a family member, should not be on the rent list, a family head stated:
Kofi’s great grandfather migrated to another town, died there and lost his entitlement to the 
family land in Brewaniase. However, years later, Kofi’s paternal great uncle returned home, and 
the family allotted him a place to farm, after which he established his family there. Kofi is a 
third-generation descendant – that is the only reason he can lay claim to the land. However, he 
does not deserve it because his great uncle’s lineage only has usufruct rights.
These injustices trickle down to non-indigenes who hold land. Sharecroppers and settlers 
who received land gifts or had purchased lands from older generations are now in dispute 
with families who, since the land deal, have failed to recognise such transactions. Some of 
those who were farming the land received compensation from the landowners. However, it 
became an effective means by which landholders restricted such non-indigenes from further 
access to rent. In some cases, powerful landowners could nullify such transactions or forcibly 
buy back those lands. Some affected family representatives have introduced new norms of 
demanding written proofs of pre-existing land transfers from ‘their foreigners’ on their rent 
lists. This situation has affected 8 of the 10 foreigners whose claim to rent are being disputed 
by family heads (see Figure 2). These findings reflect how customary land practices and 
relations can indeed evolve and adapt to ‘development’ – but, unlike the property rights 
assumptions in many economic rights theories, these practices breed conflictual relations 
over land, inequality and enclosure from below (Peters 2013).
Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature on the land question in Africa, by shedding light on 
how the rising capitalist interests in rural farmlands alter customary land relations in complex 
ways. While chiefs continue to seek opportunities from land deals, redefining or consolidating 
their authority over land, claims are also being restructured by powerful actors in the domains 
of families, thereby shaping land access dynamics and farming practices. Certainly, customary 
land institutions are not sites of equity (Fonjong and Gyapong 2021), but as we see from 
this study, the formalisation of boundaries widens the inequality gap by reducing the com-
plex patrilineal system of user and lineage rights to a narrow version of land ‘ownership’ that 
benefits a few second-generation men who control rents. Furthermore, control over the 
mode of compensation and rent distribution has become an avenue to modify existing land 
tenure relations. The one-time access to compensation became a means to exclude non-in-
digenes and settler cultivators from rent and thus from their pre-existing claims to land. 
Family members with entitlements to fragmented or subdivided lands rather than ‘family 
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commons’ have gained guaranteed access to rent, thereby defying the purpose and benefits 
of reserved ‘family commons’.
In any case, rents cannot be equated to previous social, economic, cultural and environ-
mental gains from the land. Importantly, the generational implications of large-scale land 
transactions cannot be overstated. Given the fluid and unpredictable livelihood strategies 
of the youth who occasionally shuttle between rural and city life, losing family lands jeop-
ardises any security of life in agriculture. The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, forcing 
the youth who have lost their jobs in the city to return to their hometowns and villages, 
makes this point even more crucial. This situation will also threaten competition over residual 
lands and frontier areas in the future (Li 2017). Regardless of the changing rural economies, 
often characterised by occupations in off-farm jobs, petty trading and services, access to 
land is still central to the security of rural livelihoods. These situations exacerbate inequality, 
trigger covert intra-family conflicts and build tensions among families, settlers, migrants 
and sharecroppers. As noted, the history of land relations in Ghana suggests that customary 
land tenure in any local context defies fixed definition, as these definitions continuously 
evolve in response to social, political and economic transformations. The directions of change 
emanating from this sudden commodification endanger present and future land tenure 
security, particularly user rights for subsistence farming.
Evidence from this research resonates with several other studies that have examined the 
changes in land and social relations following both foreign and state-led expropriations of 
customary farmland in Ghana (Amanor 1999; Kuusaana 2017). Although the political dynam-
ics may differ across customary land tenure contexts with different degrees of family and 
chieftaincy authority, smallholders who are women, youth, sharecroppers, migrants and 
ethnic minorities without sufficient control over land resources are the most adversely 
affected. Indeed, women are subjected to further adversities within these marginalised 
groups, even if the labour prospects are considered. An earlier study by Gyapong (2019) 
showed that women who always prided themselves on their own small-scale farming are 
now attracted to wage labour on the plantation. However, they have the fewest job oppor-
tunities, work under precarious conditions, remain the lowest income earners, and at the 
same time shoulder the vast majority of household responsibilities (Gyapong 2019).
In Africa, land and investment policies hardly address the inherent inequalities associated 
with land transactions. Thus, rural people ought to be protected from the casual promises 
of development. Ghana’s market-led land institutions, and its historical and ongoing fad for 
foreign and capitalist investments that are primarily driven by modernisation and produc-
tivity discourses under the rhetoric of jobs, food and economic development, do not safe-
guard the livelihoods of marginalised rural groups. The persistent denial and indifference 
on the part of state institutions regarding the negative impacts of land grabbing in Ghana 
imply that systemic changes to land policies and investments would require concerted efforts 
from researchers and civil society organisations via diverse platforms to raise awareness, 
and to sensitise the public through the lens of the ongoing and broader global land rush, 
rather than a narrow local investment narrative. Due to the customary nature of Ghana’s 
rural agricultural land tenure and the centrality of traditional institutions in the rural econ-
omy, the state has a critical role to play, from above rather than from below. Civil society 
pressures on the state can be targeted at investment agencies and institutions, to conduct 
necessary checks and due diligence before even allowing the entry of such businesses. In 
the same way that investors are compelled to abide by strict financial requirements and 
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specific legal obligations, other aspects, such as information on investment models and land 
lease documentation, could be incorporated into agribusiness registration procedures. A 
land capping measure could also be a way to control indiscriminate acquisitions and monitor 
investments, although one cannot predict how customary institutions may respond to them. 
At the same time, there is a need for changes to obsolete compensation and rent laws that 
do not favour women, rural landholders or cultivators. While these policy suggestions may 
not be the most radical alternatives, if implemented they can serve as proactive measures 
to ensure responsible investments or prevent disruptive ones.
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Notes
 1. Among some ethnic groups, chiefs are not custodians of family lands.
 2. Brewaniase is the seat of the Ntrubo Paramount chief and the capital town of the Ntrubo tradi-
tional area.
 3. A paramount chief is a formally recognised superior leader/chief of an ethnic group and the 
communities under their jurisdiction, often a member of a regional/national house of chiefs. 
This recognised body unites traditional rulers in Ghana.
 4. All 11 communities in the Ntrubo traditional area. The chiefs in these communities double as 
sub-chiefs under the paramountcy. Brewaniase is the seat of the paramount chief.
 5. The mounds are for planting yams and potatoes.
 6. https://www.modernghana.com/news/30274/psi-on-oil-palm-to-be-launched-in-april.html
 7. It was an affiliate of Herakles Capital New York, a private investment firm in the telecommuni-
cations, energy and agro-industry sectors.
 8. Volta Red is under the directorship of two British investors affiliated with the Wyse Group 
Limited, a UK construction company.
 9. The stool is the symbol and authority of chieftaincy among many southern ethnic groups, and 
‘stool lands’ refers to lands under chiefs’ custody.
 10. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/land-deal-brief-massive-deforestation-portrayed-sustain-
able-investment-deceit-herakles-farms
 11. The plantation ownership and directorship have changed hands from American to British in-
vestors (Volta Red), but it continues to operate under the terms of the original lease.
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 12. Nine ropes are equivalent to one acre within the study localities.
 13. Yam (water yam) is not a staple for the Ntrubos. It is usually farmed on rented lands, and in the 
few cases where it is sharecropped, a landlord either requests a small share of the produce in-
stead of the contractual one-third or opts for a monetary value for their share.
 14. I requested each family representative to narrate their kinship relationship to the custodians of 
the annual rent, as shown on their respective family lists. The chart represents responses from 
all family representatives consisting of fourteen men and one woman. The family lands indicat-
ed on the chart are not attached to particular individuals, but a family name or ‘brothers’.
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